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The California Practicum is a series of articles dealing with subjects of sig-
nificance to California attorneys. The purpose of the Practicum is to inform
the reader of practical problems on the cutting edge of California law in both
the state and federal forums, and to act as an initial resource for finding so-
lutions to those problems.
Analysis of a First Amendment Challenge
to Rent-A-Judge Proceedings
I. INTRODUCTION
Most plaintiffs that bring civil actions in the courts today are faced
with a crowded court docket that delays their case for years. Once a
case has been properly filed within the statute of limitations in Los
Angeles, for example, it falls into a line approximately five years
long to reach the hearing stage.' One author noted that in 1981 there
were more than 73,000 cases awaiting trial in these courts.2 Many
plaintiffs want something faster and are willing to pay for it. The
rent-a-judge justice system is just what is needed by those who do not
want to wait and are willing to spend the extra money.
The rent-a-judge procedure was authorized by California state law
in 1872.3 However, very little use was made of the procedure until
1. Myers, Rent-a-Judge in California, 131 NEw L.J. 1042 (1981).
2. Id. at 1043.
3. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 638 (West 1976 & Supp. 1987). Five other states-Ne-
braska, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington-also have procedures in
which all parties can stipulate to have a private person rule on a pending lawsuit with
the same force and effect as a constitutional judge. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1129 to
25-1137 (1979); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4301-4321 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1987); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 3.300-3.321 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-15-1 to 9-15-21 (1985); and WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.48.010-4.48.130 (1962 & Supp. 1987).
See also SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, THE ELEMENTS OF
GOOD PRACTICE IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 283-84 (C. Cutrona ed. 1984). The Honorable
the mid-1970's when some Los Angeles attorneys rediscovered the
statute in the California Code of Civil Procedure and employed it to
avoid the backlog of cases in court.4 From that point forward, an in-
creasing number of cases have been resolved by private judges who
are paid by the parties to these cases. These judges are known as
rent-a-judges.
The rebirth of the rent-a-judge statute has not come about com-
pletely trouble-free. Many questions have been raised regarding the
different constitutional issues this method of private justice raises. 5
This comment will focus on one of these issues that has not yet been
specifically decided in the courts. The primary concern is what first
amendment rights the general public has to demand access to court
proceedings and how the established rent-a-judge proceedings comply
with any rights that may exist.
The first section of this article will examine the statutes in issue
and the procedures used to implement them. The next section will
examine the nature of the rent-a-judge (or reference) proceedings.
The third and fourth sections will address the question of whether
the public has any first amendment right to attend civil trials. Next,
the secrecy of reference proceedings will be examined. In the final
section of the article, the possible conflicts between any rights of ac-
cess and private property rights will be analyzed.
II. FUNCTION OF A RENT-A-JUDGE PROCEEDING
The chapter in the California Code of Civil Procedure which grants
authority for the rent-a-judge proceedings is entitled "Of References
and Trials by Referees."6 As this title indicates, the statutory term
for the proceedings is a reference and the rent-a-judge himself is
properly called the referee.7
"A reference may be ordered upon the agreement of the parties
.... "8 All that is required for a case to be taken up in a reference
proceeding is that the parties file either a petition or a stipulation
with the court. The court will then appoint a referee to hear the
H. Warren Knight, former Judge of the California Superior Court, now is the head of
an organization that offers private resolution of civil disputes through mediation, arbi-
tration, or any other format that is agreeable to the parties. The organization, Judicial
Arbitration and Mediation Service, Inc., is located in Orange County, California and is
well known for its use of the rent-a-judge procedure. Id. at 272.
4. Coulson, Private Settlement for the Public Good, 66 JUDICATURE June-July
1982, at 7.
5. See Note, The California Rent-a-Judge Experiment: Constitutional and Policy
Considerations of Pay-as-You-Go Courts, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1592 (1981) (the article
mentions equal protection, due process, and first amendment issues).
6. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 638-645.1 (West 1976 & Supp. 1987).
7. Id.
8. Id. § 638.
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case. 9 If appropriate, however, the court itself may order a reference
on either its own motion or on the motion of one of the parties.10
Once the referee has been appointed, the court system itself is not
involved until the conclusion of the proceedings." The parties deter-
mine a time and a place to conduct the proceedings and may even
stipulate to their own rules of discovery and evidence. All of this is
done without filing any notice in the public record.12 As a practical
matter, parties employing this system can hide their reference hear-
ings from the public by conducting the hearings in the privacy of
their homes.
Once the proceeding has been completed, the referee must file a
written report of his findings (the "statement of decision") with the
court within twenty days.1 3 The report filed must contain the refe-
9. Rosenthal & Shapiro, Invoking Private-Judge Dispute Resolution, 4 CAL.
LAW., Sept. 9, 1984, at 25. See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 640-641 (West 1976 &
Supp. 1987).
10. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 639 (West Supp. 1987), which states as follows:
When the parties do not consent, the court may, upon the application of any
party, or of its own motion, direct a reference in the following cases:
(a) When the trial of an issue of fact requires the examination of a long
account on either side; in which case the referees may be directed to hear and
decide the whole issue, or report upon any specific question of fact involved
therein.
(b) When the taking of an account is necessary for the information of the
court before judgment, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect.
(c) When a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon
motion or otherwise, in any stage of the action.
(d) When it is necessary for the information of the court in a special pro-
ceeding.
(e) When the court in any pending action determines in its discretion that
it is necessary for the court to appoint a referee to hear and determine any
and all discovery motions and disputes relevant to discovery in the action and
to report findings and make a recommendation thereon.
11. Interview with Arnold Pena, Office of the Clerk of the Superior Court (July
1986). Many proceedings are now done pursuant to article 6, section 21 of the state
constitution which provides for a judge pro tern. This constitutional provision states,
"[o]n stipulation of the parties litigant the court may order a cause to be tried by a
temporary judge who is a member of the State Bar, sworn and empowered to act until
final determination of the cause." CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 21 (emphasis added).
Parties are able to avoid the reference proceedings and their attendant requirements
and proceed under this provision. Greater problems are raised with this type of pro-
ceeding because it may be totally covert and there is no requirement that any findings
be reported. It is possible, therefore, that there will be no public record of the pro-
ceeding outside of the appointment of the judge and the ultimate conclusion. Another
issue that may cause difficulties under this provision is that the temporary judge has
complete judicial power, including the power to commit for contempt. Myers, supra
note 1, at 1042-43.
12. Rosenthal & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 27.
13. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 643 (West 1976).
ree's findings of fact and conclusions of law.14 This report becomes a
part of the public record and is available to whoever wishes to see it.
The opponents of the rent-a-judge system are not satisfied with this
method of reporting because they feel the reports are too sketchy
and lack the detail necessary for a proper and complete evaluation of
the case.' 5
III. ARE THESE COURT PROCEEDINGS?
A necessary step in the analysis of the rent-a-judge system is to de-
termine whether or not reference proceedings are in fact court pro-
ceedings. It will be this distinction which determines the context of
this discussion.
The authorizing statute states: "The decision of the referee must
stand as the decision of the court... and upon filing of the statement
of decision. . . judgment may be entered thereon in the same manner
as if the action had been tried by the court."16 Furthermore, deci-
sions made in reference proceedings are appealable in the same man-
ner as are any other court's rulings.17
Any tribunal which exercises functions that are of a strictly judi-
cial character is a court.' 8 Reference proceedings operate exclusively
in a judicial capacity and are defined by statute to be synonymous in
their function with the traditional courts.19 Therefore, it would be il-
logical to contend that references are not court proceedings since the
legislature has drafted the authorizing statute to make the two meth-
ods of judicial dispute resolution functionally identical.
The California Code of Civil Procedure states that all court pro-
ceedings are open to the public.20 Therefore, it would seem that the
plain language of the statute solves any problems of exclusion by ex-
pressly ordering that court proceedings be open to the public. How-
14. Myers, supra note 1, at 1042.
15. Pena interview, supra note 11. Section 643 of the Code of Civil Procedure re-
quires only a "statement of decision." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 643 (West 1976). Mr.
Pena indicated that this requirement is taken literally and the reports usually consist
only of a brief statement of the ultimate decision. Pena interview, supra note 11.
16. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 644 (West 1976).
17. Id. § 645. This section is what serves to separate rent-a-judge proceedings from
arbitration. The full right of appeal makes this a private court proceeding unlike arbi-
tration. Contra Coulson, supra note 4, at 8.
18. Chinn v. Superior Court, 156 Cal. 478, 482, 105 P. 580, 582 (1909). Accord CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 644 (West 1976), which states that the decision of the referee is the
same as the decision of the court. In addition, the case is treated as a trial decision for
all future purposes. Id. § 645.
19. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 638 (West 1976).
20. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 34, 124 (West 1982). Section 34 states that all of
the provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure apply to all courts that are not specifi-
cally exempted. Id. § 34. Section 124 requires courts covered by this code to hold all
sittings in public. Id. § 124.
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ever, the controversy regarding the exclusion of the public exists
largely because of unduly wide acceptance of a statement made in the
Harvard Law Review that the statute mandating open trials does not
apply to reference proceedings. 21 The article states, without citing
substantial authority, that there is no obligation to admit the public
to these "private trials."22 The article also states that the judges may
be selected on the basis of their agreement to completely exclude
members of the general public that request access.23 However, the
article concludes that since these proceedings are closed to the public,
they are violative of the first amendment right of public access to
court proceedings. 24
The fundamental problem with this assertion is that it has no sup-
port in case law and contradicts the controlling statutes. Since refer-
ences are classified as court proceedings, 25 the controlling statutes
require the proceedings to be open to the public.26 However, since
this issue has not been decided in the courts, it is necessary to deter-
mine if there is any constitutional right to attend a civil proceeding
without an express provision of any statute. If there is such a consti-
tutional right, an attorney representing a newspaper or other party
interested in attending the proceedings could use the argument to
force the parties to open the doors.
21. Note, supra note 5, at 1609 n.93. The author limits the applicability of section
124 to "courts of record." Id However, the statute plainly states that "the sittings of
every court shall be public." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 124 (West 1982) (emphasis
added).
22. Note, supra note 5, at 1598.
23. 1& at 1599-1600.
24. Id. at 1614. For a discussion of the first amendment right involved, see infra
notes 27-76 and accompanying text.
25. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
26. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 124 (West 1982). The analysis contained in the
Harvard Law Review student note assumes that reference proceedings are, in fact,
court proceedings. The problem this presents is that even if a reference is a court pro-
ceeding, it is not unconstitutional as section 124 of the California Code of Civil Proce-
dure requires courts to be open to the public. Id. See also supra note 20. This is based
on the fact that there are no cases involving the exclusion of the public from reference
proceedings. If, however, the rent-a-judge hearing is not a court proceeding, and sec-
tion 124 does not apply, then there is no constitutional problem in this case because the
recognized constitutional right to attend court proceedings would not apply.
Therefore, the conclusion that rent-a-judge proceedings pursuant to section 638 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure are violative of the first amendment is not sup-
portable by the analysis found in the student article mentioned above. If reference
proceedings are court proceedings, section 124 opens them to the public. If they are
not court proceedings, any argument regarding the first amendment right to attend tri-
als does not apply.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PUBLIC ACCESS
Throughout the history of the common law, court proceedings have
been open to the public. "[I]t is one of the essential qualities of a
Court of Justice that its proceedings should be public, and that all
parties who may be desirous of hearing what is going on . .. have a
right to be present for the purpose of hearing what is going on." 27 To
close the doors to the sitting of any court in a denial of public access
would conflict with the long-standing common law tradition.28
This tradition has not been abandoned by modern courts. The
United States Supreme Court has said that "[a] trial is a public event.
What transpires in the courtroom is public property."29 Thus, the re-
quirement that the doors of trial courts be open to the public has
more than just a lengthy tradition to support it. It has been recog-
nized that the public has a need to have access to the active operation
of the judiciary.30
A. The Value of the Open Trial
In our society's republican system of self-government, the first
amendment plays a fundamental role.31 There is a widely held no-
tion that by opening the doors of the courts, the community is reas-
sured that justice is being done.32 There is a certain community
therapeutic value to public trials. 33 They allow a community cathar-
sis that would not be possible if justice were done in a covert man-
ner.34 Justice Brennan has written that "[s]ecrecy is profoundly
inimical to this demonstrative purpose of the trial process. Open tri-
als assure the public that procedural rights are respected, and that
justice is afforded equally. Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice
and arbitrariness, which in turn spawns disrespect for law."35 Dis-
27. Daubney v. Cooper, 109 Eng. Rep. 438, 440 (1829).
28. Comment, Private Means to Public Ends: Implications of the Private Judging
Phenomenon in California, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 611, 639 (1984).
29. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality ruled that there is a first amendment right
for the public to attend criminal trials that cannot be defeated by mere agreement of
the parties and the court); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (criminal
trial may be closed to protect rights of the accused). The Richmond Newspapers Court
did not decide the question of access to civil trials but noted an historical presumption
of open trials in both civil and criminal trials. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580
n.17.
30. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
31. The first amendment states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to peti-
tion the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
32. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 570.
34. Id. at 571.
35. Id. at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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trust of secrecy is reflected in the principle that justice carried on be-
hind walls of silence cannot survive.36
1. Fairness Through Public Involvement
The open trial enhances the appearance of fairness in the system
which is essential to public confidence. 37 The role of the first amend-
ment is to insure the public that the government will not interfere
with the communicative processes. While on the one hand there is a
need to be free to speak, on the other there is the need to hear what
the government is doing. It is through this process of verbal give and
take that citizens are able to exercise the right of self-government.
"[T]he First Amendment protects the structure of communications
necessary for the existence of our democracy." 38 To do this, there
must be a guarantee that the political society will be able to scruti-
nize the government and hold it accountable. 39 The very fabric of a
self-governing society is woven with the confidence of the community
in the operation of that system. If that confidence is lost, the struc-
ture will fail for lack of the necessary foundational support.
The public trial also serves as a check on those individuals in posi-
tions of authority who might be tempted to abuse their power and in-
fluence.40 The open door policy in court proceedings serves to
further the interests of justice by improving the quality of testimony
and inducing unknown witnesses to come forward with relevant tes-
timony.41 The pressure accompanying the knowledge that all of their
conduct within the trials is open to scrutiny causes trial participants
to perform their duties with greater care. This pressure also discour-
36. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349 (1966) (Clark, J.) (citing In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 268 (1948), which compares secret trials to the Spanish Inquisition). In
Sheppard, a new trial was ordered because of the amount of publicity in the case which
involved the bludgeoning death of the petitioner's wife. The Court recognized that the
usual policy for an open trial was outweighed in that case by the probability of unfair-
ness. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363.
37. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (guarantee of
open proceedings in criminal trials extended to the voir dire examination of jurors).
38. Lewis, Keynote Address: The Right to Scrutinize Government: Toward a First
Amendment Theory of Accountability, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 793, 805 (1980) (quoting
Address by Justice William Brennan, Rutgers Law School (Oct. 17, 1979), reprinted in
32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173 (1979)).
39. Id. at 806.
40. Comment, All Courts Shall Be Open: The Public's Right To View Judicial Pro-
ceedings and Records, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 311, 313 (1979).
41. Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979).
ages perjury and any decisions based upon secret bias or partiality.42
It is readily apparent how important public trials are to a republi-
can system of self-government. Open trials not only serve to reassure
the community and provide a cathartic release, but they also serve as
a regulator of the conduct within judicial proceedings. The public
scrutiny is an effective method of controlling those with authority
subject to abuse.
An argument has been raised, however, that all of these goals
could be accomplished by the publication of reference decisions or
even the release of transcripts of reference proceedings.43 This posi-
tion is theoretically valid in that a reference transcript contains the
entire proceeding as it actually occurred. However, as a practical
matter, it can also be argued that a cold record is no substitute for
public attendance. It is only the direct, personal observation that
gives the public the true picture and the sense of exactly how justice
is being done.44
2. Media Coverage and Prior Restraint
There is a special need for the press to be present in the court-
room, as media coverage is the facilitator of the public awareness of
what transpires inside the courtroom. One of the major goals of open
trial proceedings is achieved by subjecting the actions of trial partici-
pants to this type of widespread scrutiny.45
The element of time is important for press coverage. If the infor-
mation is to reach the public promptly, it is necessary for the report-
ers to be able to observe the actual court proceedings. Reference
proceedings, however, can be hidden from the public-a characteris-
tic for which the system has received much criticism.46 The problem
that could potentially arise is that since the reference system is cre-
ated by state law, state action is present.4 7 It follows that the opera-
tion of reference proceedings could be considered a prior restraint on
the freedom of the press when neither the public nor the press would
be able to locate the proceedings.
Any prior restraint on expression carries a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity.48 This kind of restraint on speech
and publication is among the most serious and least tolerable in-
42. Id See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569
(1980)(plurality opinion).
43. Pena Interview, supra note 11.
44. Comment, supra note 40, at 316.
45. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569.
46. See, e.g., Note, supra note 5.
47. Constitutional prohibitions of the first and fourteenth amendments apply only
to actions taken by government. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 10.4, 319-20 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter J. NOWAK].
48. Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976).
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fringements on first amendment rights. It goes beyond the "chilling"
of speech; it "freezes" speech for a period of time.49 As yet, no one
has made such a claim against the reference procedure.50 However,
this potential problem is a good example of the obstacles an attorney
might have to endure when handling a notorious case by reference.
3. Is There a Special Right For the Media to Attend
Court Proceedings?
The importance of the role of the media in the legal system raises
another question. That is, does the function of the press in reporting
trial proceedings to the general public create in the press a special
right to attend all court proceedings? The United States Supreme
Court has stressed the media's importance in bringing about the ben-
eficial effects of public scrutiny on the administration of justice.51
The Court has also recognized that the vast majority of society today
relies on the press to supply them with any pertinent information re-
garding governmental actions.52 Thus, it is well recognized that the
press serves an indispensable function in the structure of self-
government.
In spite of this, the press has no more constitutional right to access
information in the government's control than does the general pub-
lic. 5 3 The public and the press also have the same right of access to
judicial proceedings.54 Since the function of the press is to relay in-
formation to the public through which the public can scrutinize gov-
ernment, there is no reason for the press to be privileged to
information which cannot be released to the community at large. For
the press to be able to adequately carry out its role in society, it only
needs to be able to gain that information which is available for those
to whom it is reporting.
B. Freedom of Speech and the Right to a Fair Trial
Even though both civil and criminal trials were open to the public
49. Id. at 559.
50. Interview with Myrna Oliver, Legal Reporter for the Los Angeles Times (July,
1986).
51. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975). "With respect to ju-
dicial proceedings in particular, the function of the press serves to guarantee the fair-
ness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the
administration of justice." Id.
52. Id.
53. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978).
54. Comment, supra note 40, at 341.
under common law rules, there exists a question today as to whether
there is a constitutional right to attend such proceedings.55 The
United States Supreme Court has determined that there is no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy for the parties in judicial proceedings.5 6
Therefore, the parties themselves cannot close the courtroom doors
by asserting a constitutional right to privacy. The real question is,
however, whether the general public has a right to attend trials.
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Gannett Co. v. DePas-
quale57 within the context of the sixth amendment.5 8 The Court de-
cided that the sixth amendment does not give the general public a
constitutional right to attend trials.59 It was recognized that while
open trials had a long tradition in the common law, there is no right
contained in the first or sixth amendments which grants the public
access to trials.6 0 Therefore, in a situation in which all the parties
have agreed to close the doors to the civil courtroom, the public has
no right of access under the sixth amendment.61
Subsequently, in Waller v. Georgia,62 the Court recognized that
the sixth amendment created a constitutional right for the criminal
defendant to demand an open trial. In this decision, the Court stated
that before the public could be excluded from a trial, a stringent test
had to be satisfied showing that the closure was necessary to protect
a particularly articulated and overriding interest. 63
This issue was again before the Court in Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia.64 On this occasion the question was framed in terms
of the public's first amendment right to attend criminal trials. Chief
Justice Burger recognized in the plurality opinion that the right of
free speech necessarily carries with it some right to listen.65 There-
fore, in order for the public to be able to exercise the right of free
speech and scrutinize the judicial system, there must exist a right for
them to hear what actually goes on in the courts.
There are certain unarticulated rights which are implicit in the
enumerated guarantees.66 These rights are necessary to put flesh on
55. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382-83 (1979).
56. Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 493-95.
57. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
58. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
59. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 384.
60. Id. at 385.
61. Id. at 387. First amendment concerns cannot be set aside by mere agreement
of the parties, however. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
62. 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
63. Id. at 45. See also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510
(1984).
64. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
65. Id. at 578.
66. Id. at 579.
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the framework of the express rights and fulfill the true intentions of
the draftsmen of the Constitution. "First Amendment guarantees of
speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summa-
rily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public
at the time that Amendment was adopted." 67 Hence, case law has es-
tablished that there is a right of access to criminal trials implicit in
the first amendment.68
This right of access recognized by the Supreme Court is not an ab-
solute right, however;6 9 it has certain qualifications. The Court held
in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court 7o that access to a proceed-
ing may be denied, but only if denial is made necessary by a compel-
ling governmental interest, and is then narrowly tailored to serve
that interest.7 ' The Globe Court examined a statute which created a
per se exclusion of the public from courtrooms in cases involving vic-
tims of sex offenses who were under eighteen years of age. Because
of its mandatory exclusion provisions, the statute was held to be vio-
lative of the first amendment right of the public to attend criminal
trials.72 Moreover, the statute failed to provide any standard which
the trial court could apply to protect this public right.
A standard was set, however, for courts to follow in cases involving
public access to trials in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of
California.73 The Press-Enterprise standard provided that "[t]he pre-
sumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding inter-
est based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher
values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."74 The Ninth
67. Id. at 576.
68. Id. The cases discussing this point, however, have all dealt with criminal trials.
Any references made to civil proceedings have been dicta. See, e.g., id. at 580 n.17.
69. Id. at 581 n.18. The plurality noted that the first amendment interest of the
press prevailed only because the decision to close the doors of the court was made
wholly upon the fact that the parties to the trial agreed to do so. Id.
70. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
71. Id. at 606-07.
72. Id. at 610.
73. 464 U.S. 501 (1984). In Press-Enterprise, the Court held that voir dire proceed-
ings of a rape trial could not be closed to the public unless the trial court made specific
findings that some overriding interest, such as the jurors' right to privacy in answering
sensitive questions, was being infringed upon. Also, there must be a specific finding
that there was no less restrictive alternative, such as censoring from the public only
the sensitive questions and answers. Id. at 509-13. The Court further held that the
trial judge, instead of closing three full days of voir dire proceedings, could have in-
formed the jury that they could discuss the sensitive issues in camera. The judge
could have then determined whether or not the juror should have been excused or the
record sealed. Id. at 512.
74. Id. at 510. See also Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). The Court applied
Circuit Court of Appeals went even further to hold that even when
the first amendment right of access is in direct conflict with the de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial, there must be a show-
ing that closing the trial "is strictly and inescapably necessary in
order to protect the fair-trial guarantee." 75 The trial judge has the
responsibility to consider this right of public access even if neither
party urges it before the court.76
V. EXTENDING THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE CIVIL TRIAL
The foregoing analysis presents a relatively clear public right to at-
tend criminal trials. However, all of the cases discussed above are
criminal cases, and the Court was speaking directly to the public ac-
cess issue in the context of criminal procedure. Moreover, in the
civil context, reference proceedings statutorily exist as mere alterna-
tive dispute resolution forums.7 7 The question thus arises whether
this first amendment right of public access to judicial proceedings ex-
tends to civil trials. If so, does the rent-a-judge process violate this
right?
In Richmond Newspapers, Chief Justice Burger pointed out that
the common law presumption of openness extended to both criminal
and civil proceedings.78 In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan
suggested that the scrutiny of the judiciary and the appearance of
fairness to the community is a necessary function in the civil as well
as in the criminal arena.7 9 Furthermore, in Gannett Co. v. DePas-
quale,SO the Court stated:
Indeed, many of the advantages of public criminal trials are equally applicable
in the civil trial context. While the operation of the judicial process in civil
cases is often of interest only to the parties in the litigation, this is not always
the case .... [I]n some civil cases the public interest in access and the salutary
effect of publicity may be as strong as, or stronger than, in most criminal
cases.
8 1
These statements, in conjunction with dicta from these two cases,
have persuaded some courts to hold that the first amendment right
to access should be applied to all court proceedings, criminal and
this rule to a case in which the public was excluded for seven days of evidentiary hear-
ings. This was found to be too extensive since only during two and one-half hours of
the seven day hearing was the exclusion of the public actually justified. Id. at 49.
75. Associated Press v. United States District Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir.
1983) (quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 440 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)).
76. Comment, Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Public Access to
Judicial Proceedings, 91 HARV. L. REV., 1899 (1978).
77. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 638-39 (West Supp. 1987).
78. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980).
79. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 596 (Brennan, J., concurring).
80. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
81. Id. at 386-87 n.15..
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civil.8 2 Some believe it should apply to disputes handled by a rent-a-
judge.8 3
A California Court of Appeal has held that there is no first amend-
ment right of public access to pre-trial discovery orders and protec-
tive orders in civil proceedings.8 4 The court in that case distinguished
Richmond Newspapers by contrasting in-court proceedings with pre-
trial proceedings.8 5 However, the opinion does not answer the ques-
tion of public access to the actual trial. The most recent word from
the United States Supreme Court on open civil trials was Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in the Globe Newspaper case. She said, "I in-
terpret neither Richmond Newspapers, Inc. nor the Court's decision
today to carry any implications outside the context of criminal tri-
als."86 There has been no declaration from the Court, however, that
is dispositive of the issue.
It is impossible to predict exactly how the United States Supreme
Court would decide the issue if faced with such a case. There is dicta
from the Court on both sides of the issue. It would seem that the ra-
tionale supporting open criminal trials is sufficiently applicable to the
civil arena to justify a right of public access under certain circum-
stances. However, since the need for access appears stronger in the
criminal context, perhaps an easier burden should be imposed in civil
proceedings to justify the exclusion of the public. Good faith argu-
ments can be made for either position and an attorney litigating the
issue should be able to find policy favorable to his side.
VI. ARE REFERENCE PROCEEDINGS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SECRET?
Even assuming there were a constitutional right of access to civil
trials, and that rent-a-judge proceedings are deemed court sittings,
there is nothing in the California statutory provisions that is violative
of this right.8 7 By statutory law, all court proceedings are open to the
82. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir.
1984); Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984); Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1100 (1984).
83. Note, supra note 5, at 1609.
84. Coalition Against Police Abuse v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 888, 216
Cal. Rptr. 614 (1985).
85. Id. at 899-900, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
86. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 611 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
87. See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text.
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public.88 However, it has been asserted that the public is effectively
excluded from reference proceedings by not being informed as to
when and where the hearings are held and that this amounts to a vio-
lation of the Constitution.89
Opponents of the rent-a-judge system point out that there is no
published list of filings for reference and no record of the times and
places of reference proceedings available.90 They contend that these
are secret proceedings that are being intentionally hidden from the
public.
The only way to find out when and where a certain reference pro-
ceeding will take place is to check with the court clerk on a daily ba-
sis until the particular case is filed for reference. Once a case has
been filed and a judge appointed, the clerk will have only the names
of the parties' attorneys and the judge. It is still necessary to per-
suade one of the people involved to disclose the time and place of the
hearing.91 The only problem, however, is that there is no require-
ment that they divulge this information. An informal survey con-
ducted by the Los Angeles Times has revealed that the reference
judges, or referees, are split on the issue; some said they would dis-
close the information, while others said they would not.92
Once the clerk has been contacted and the judge and attorneys lo-
cated, the decision over whether or not anyone gets into the hearing
is out of the state's hands. First amendment guarantees are only pro-
tected against abridgement by federal or state government, 9 3 and
thus there is presumably no protection if the attorneys of record re-
fuse to disclose the location of the hearings. In these cases, no ex-
plicit state action is involved in denying the public access to the
proceedings.
The question is closer, however, when it is the rental judge who re-
fuses to provide the information. Although the parties to the pro-
ceeding pay the judge's wages,94 the judge is appointed by the court
and is carrying out the duties of a state judicial officer in a court pro-
ceeding.95 Hence, a referee acts under color of law. As such, his act
of refusing to disclose the location of the reference proceedings
should constitute state action and a consequent first amendment
violation.
88. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 124 (West 1982).
89. Comment, supra note 28, at 640.
90. Id.
91. Pena Interview, supra note 11.
92. Oliver Interview, supra note 50.
93. J. NOWAK, supra note 47, at 319-20.
94. Comment, supra note 28, at 626.
95. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 638-39, 645.1 (West Supp. 1987).
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VII. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO ACCESS VERSUS PRIVATE
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Rent-a-judge proceedings, by nature, raise an issue regarding pri-
vate property rights. The question arises since the parties to the ref-
erence decide upon the location of the hearing. If they choose to hold
the proceeding in an empty courtroom or a public meeting hall, there
is no infringement on private property rights. It is common, how-
ever, for these hearings to be held in the private offices of an attor-
ney or even in one of the parties' homes.96 The question is whether
the general public can demand access to reference hearings held at a
private home under the first amendment or under state law requir-
ing court proceedings to be public.
The Supreme Court held in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner97 that the own-
ers of a shopping center could prevent the distribution of handbills
on their land without violating the first amendment.98 "[T]he First
and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the rights of free speech and
assembly by limitations on state action, not on action by the owner of
private property used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes
only." 99 Thus, there is no protection of the right of free speech under
the federal constitution against a private person. 100
Incumbent upon the private property owner, however, is the re-
quirement that there be no unlawful discrimination. If the land-
owner is willing to permit one person to exercise free speech rights
on his property, he must allow everyone else to do the same.101 An-
other restriction on private landowners is the requirement that there
be an alternative avenue of communication made available through
which the first amendment right can be exercised. 102 With respect to
reference proceedings, there is no alternative avenue for exercising
the right of access other than to permit it. Therefore, closed refer-
ence proceedings in a private home arguably violate any first amend-
ment right of access to court proceedings.
The Court in Lloyd, referring to a "company town," noted that a
private enterprise carrying out all of the functions of a municipality
satisfies the state action requirement and is capable of violating the
96. Pena Interview, supra note 11.
97. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 567 (emphasis in original).
100. Id.
101. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
102. Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 566.
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first amendment.103 A private home or office being used as a state
courtroom is analogous to the company town referred to in Lloyd. In
this context, even the private home may be a limited forum of state
action and require the same first amendment protections as the pub-
lic courthouse.
In California, the protection afforded free speech is even more in-
clusive than the first amendment of the federal constitution. The
California Supreme Court held in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping
Center104 that the public interest in peaceful speech outweighs the
desire of property owners for control over their property.105 This de-
cision by the California court directly contrasts with the United
States Supreme Court's ruling in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner.106 The
Pruneyard decision stated that the owner of a shopping center could
not prevent the peaceful exercise of free speech rights on his prem-
ises.107 The United States Supreme Court upheld the California deci-
sion, stating that the states could properly offer greater protection of
first amendment rights than the federal constitution.'0 8
Given the greater protection of first amendment freedom afforded
in California, it is apparent that denial of access to rent-a-judge pro-
ceedings in this state would violate the right to open trials, if indeed
such a right exists. Even though the private home location weighs in
favor of an opposite result, it seems clear that any right of access to
judicial proceedings attaches to reference hearings, no matter where
they are held.
Does this mean that a court may force private individuals who wish
to utilize the rent-a-judge procedure to open their private homes to
the general public? It seems unlikely that a court would do this.109
It does not seem unreasonable, however, that a court would enjoin a
reference hearing until a more suitable location is selected to accom-
modate public access.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Do reference proceedings and rental judges violate first amend-
ment rights? As the law currently stands, the answer is no. How-
103. Id. at 562.
104. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, affd, 447 U.S. 74 (1979). See
also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2. "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or
her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may
not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." Id-
105. Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
106. 407 U.S. 551 (1972). For a discussion of the holding in Lloyd, see supra notes
97-103 and accompanying text.
107. Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
108. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
109. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 84 (the Court expressly reserved judgment on the issue
that would be raised if a private home were involved).
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ever, many issues are raised by this procedure that have not been
decided by any court. Among these are the following: (1) whether
the reference hearing is a court proceeding; (2) whether there is a
first amendment right of access to civil trials; (3) whether the state
action, in implementing reference judgments, violates any constitu-
tional rights, regardless of the statute requiring open proceedings;
(4) whether the policy behind open trials is strong enough to require
these proceedings to be open to the public; and (5) whether or not
private property rights have to yield to the demand of the public to
attend.
There have been no judicial challenges to the practice of reference
procedures being held behind closed doors. It seems inevitable, how-
ever, that with the increasing popularity of rent-a-judges, the secret
proceeding challenge will soon be made. Considering the strength of
the policy against secret judicial proceedings, private reference hear-
ings probably will not be permitted, absent a showing that prejudice
would result from opening the hearings to the public.
Nevertheless, the many questions raised by the procedure need to
be resolved. Once a resolution is reached, the reference procedure
will be able to assume a more stable role in the judicial system. Until
that time, those utilizing the rent-a-judge procedure for privacy
should be aware of the potential difficulties and be prepared to liti-
gate them in an open court if the challenge does arise.
PERRY L. GLANTZ
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